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IN modern Western society, suicide is considereda derivative of mental illness. Though suicide has
occurred throughout human history, its widespread
attribution to mental illness has developed only in
the last 200 years due to the medicalization of de-
viance [Conrad and Schneider, 1980]. Most current
research on suicidality is produced by the medical
and legal sectors and focuses on methods of preven-
tion, assuming the irrationality of suicidal ideation.
Current sociological inquiries tend to neglect mean-
ingful contextual analysis and frame suicidality as an
individual mental problem which must be addressed
through prevention methods targeting high-risk in-
dividuals [Wray et al., 2011]. The dominance of cul-
tural values that promote medical understandings of
previously non-medical phenomena has led academics
and the general population to accept mental illness as
the cause of suicide without completing sufficient crit-
ical analysis [Pridmore, 2011]. The connection be-
tween suicidality and mental illness makes sense from
a broad perspective and applies to many cases but
does not address several key issues that arise upon
contextual exploration of the topic. This paper ob-
serves the complexities of mental illness and suicidal-
ity through contemporary and historical standpoints
to determine the degree to which they are connected.
It finds that the widespread understanding in mod-
ern Western society that suicidality is inherent and
automatic evidence of mental illness is misled due
to its basis in oversimplified conceptions of mental
illness and suicidality. Specifically, it demonstrates
that suicidality is caused by a diverse variety of fac-
tors and can occur in the absence of mental illness.
The perspective that suicidality is inherently de-
rived from mental illness implies that the presence
of mental illness can be objectively determined. Al-
though the clinical identification of individual mental
illnesses can be supported by evidence, the broader
concept of “mental illness” is a subjective descrip-
tor which cannot be defined by any one characteris-
tic. Rather, mental illness is a hypothetical construct
which describes a diverse range of deviant psycholog-
ical modes or characteristics [Morey, 1991]. In con-
trast to many other medical conditions, the category
of “mental illness” has no essential distinguishing
characteristic and thus cannot be explicitly defined
([Zechmeister, 2018]). Suicidality is not inherently
evidential of mental illness because the hypothetical
construct of mental illness is not itself a disease with
which suicidality can be comorbid.
That said, it is generally understood that “mental
illness” refers to maladaptive mental patterns which
significantly disrupt one’s ability to function physi-
cally, emotionally, or both. Those who are mentally
ill struggle with “normal” life processes that are con-
sidered manageable to the mentally healthy person
[Sanati, 2009]. Psychiatrist Paul McHugh divides the
diverse manifestations of mental illness into four cat-
egories. Most of these categories describe the exacer-
bation of a mental pattern that is considered normal
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when exhibited to a lesser extent or in abnormal or
distressing life conditions [McNally, 2012]. The cat-
egories detail abnormal responses to general life, in
which a person fails to respond in a healthy way
to regular lived experiences. Determining whether
a person is mentally ill is difficult because their men-
tal state must be weighed against their experiences to
determine whether it is a “normal” reaction to their
situation. If this weighing is not performed, and a
person’s mental state is judged outside of the con-
text of their situation, the concept of mental illness
ceases to have meaning. Thus, mental health and
mental illness must be distinguished through contex-
tualized judgments of abnormality.
Suicidality indicates an unwillingness to continue
living for any number of reasons. If the reason is
that one cannot function in regular life conditions
without struggling psychologically, mental illness is
present. However, if one has simply endured or is en-
during something that is widely considered unbear-
able even for a mentally healthy person, then their
suicidality is not pathological, and they may be con-
sidered mentally healthy [Dorff, 1998]. The element
that ultimately distinguishes between these concepts
is normality. Importantly, what constitutes “normal”
behaviour is a significant point of contention in psy-
chology and can be determined only theoretically in
a process of social consensus. What is considered
normal and abnormal varies immensely throughout
history and across cultures, and thus, no action or
state can be objectively said to stem from mental
illness or health [Leenaars, 2002]. Thus, an under-
standing of suicidality among modern conceptions of
mental health and illness must be constructed from
a place of strong intercultural and historical aware-
ness. This must be done with the understanding that
mental health and illness are fluid, and suicidality has
the potential to be seen as frequently, but never cer-
tainly, abnormal.
The idea that suicidality is irrevocably linked to
mental illness rests on the assumption that, morally,
death should always be avoided [Ashraf, 2007]. This
perspective is informed by a wealth of cultural and
historical discourse surrounding the value and mean-
ing of life. Critical consideration of this basic life and
death paradigm is necessary to understand the vari-
ous perspectives on suicidality. Although Western so-
ciety conceptualizes suicidality in terms of methods
of prevention and the experience of the individual,
many current and past cultures focus on its moral
repugnancy instead of examining its practical effects
[Sanati, 2009]. Today’s discourse fits well with the
modern movement for mental health but lacks the
critical lens of past eras and other cultures.
Although there have been diverse perceptions of
suicide throughout history, one common thread is the
idea that it is a boldly intentional act. Until suici-
dality was introduced into the medical sphere in the
1800s, society held various perspectives on its moral-
ity but generally agreed that responsibility for the act
rested on the individual, whose mental stability was
not in question [Marsh, 2013]. Suicide was widely la-
beled a criminal act since the time of Ancient Greece
when philosophers argued that taking one’s life was a
conscious choice that disrespected state resources and
had negative social effects [Ashraf, 2007]. The de-
criminalization of suicide in Western society removed
the historically accepted agency of those who expe-
rience suicidality and positioned them as powerless
victims of an irrational outcome of mental illness.
Regardless of whether suicide is framed as a crimi-
nal act or a victimizing experience, it is and has been
considered unnatural and abominable in Western so-
ciety [Ashraf, 2007]. Since suicidal persons are not
presently criminalized, they must be victimized, re-
gardless of context, to substantiate the Western cog-
nitive bias that suicide is wrong. To escape this lim-
iting bias and examine the connection between sui-
cidality and mental illness more critically, one must
explore the perspectives of non-Western knowledge
systems.
In various non-Western historical and contem-
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porary cultures, suicide is seen, in certain circum-
stances, as a rational and even morally upright act.
Suicidality can be considered, outside of the limit-
ing criminal/victim framework used in the Western
world, as an experience more strongly rooted in the
social and environmental context than in one’s indi-
vidual immorality or pathology. For example, dur-
ing most of Japan’s history, suicide has been seen
as a justifiable escape from the pressures of living
[Leenaars, 2002]. Mainstream Japanese society saw
suicide as a pitiable but sensible way to escape eco-
nomic stress, political disgrace, or other troubling
life situations as recently as the twentieth century.
It was even considered honourable to the point of
necessity in certain contexts, such as when it was
used a method to escape military capture, or as
an apology made by school principals under whose
watch large numbers of students had been harmed
[Hayakawa, 1957]. Thus, suicidality was seen as a
tool used to react to life situations and experiences,
and not as a measure of morality or mental stability.
There are several other examples of suicide being
understood outside of the context of mental illness.
The Chinese traditions of Confucianism and Taoism
value human life as the highest gift, and as such, “[see]
no right to suicide” [Hayakawa, 1957]. Similarly, the
Christian religion often poses suicide as taking away
the God-given gift of life, sinful because it removes
God’s power over life and death. Some spiritual tra-
ditions of the Indigenous peoples of Turtle Island
posit suicide as the abhorrent result of a person be-
ing out of balance and not appreciating nature’s gift
of life. However, unlike the Chinese and Christian
traditions, the Indigenous traditions in question have
historically held certain exceptions to the spiritual
aversion to suicide. For example, they have histor-
ically considered it acceptable for a warrior to give
their life in battle to win, or for elders to walk out
into snowstorms to preserve food for younger gener-
ations when it was scarce [Leenaars, 2002]. In India,
suicide has been widely condemned, being permitted
only when a person has sinned beyond redemption
[Hayakawa, 1957]. Thus, even in cultures which have
a general moral, social, legal, or spiritual opposition
to suicide, it is often the case that some suicides are
permitted. Historically, cultures and societies have
not opposed suicide absolutely. Most importantly,
they have not evaluated those experiencing suicidal-
ity based on mental abnormality or instability, but
rather on their morality or immorality as autonomous
people.
Today, Western culture surrounding life, death,
and suicide is shifting. While suicidality is still
overwhelmingly linked to mental illness in West-
ern ideologies, new ideas regarding human normal-
ity and autonomy are surfacing. A notable instance
of this is the current discourse around euthanasia
[Dorff, 1998]. Western society’s increasing accep-
tance of euthanasia indicates that at least some pro-
portion of the suicidal population is seen as mentally
stable, because amidst the current wave of mental
health action, society strives to prevent dangerous
acts of mental instability.
There are also other cases in which suicidality is
arguably not the result of psychological abnormality,
but rather a normal response to unbearable life con-
ditions. In direct contrast to the idea that suicide is
abnormal, one contemporary line of thought argues
that opting to stay alive while suffering agonizing or
hopeless conditions or circumstances can be consid-
ered abnormal [Dorff, 1998]. For example, a prisoner
undergoing continuous torture with no hope of ever
escaping may be considered rational in their suici-
dality because they are clearly assessing their living
conditions and believe death to be more bearable.
Similarly, a person suffering mental anguish due to
treatment-resistant mental illness may be rational in
their suicidality (i.e., not suicidal as the result of men-
tally ill thought patterns) if they have conducted a
similar assessment. A more controversial example is
that of suicidality provoked by economic distress, in
which case the person’s belief in the hopelessness of
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their situation may be rational under the economic
system within which they exist. Judgements that find
this response to be abnormal must be contextualized,
as the observer may not be able to understand the
level of distress caused by this situation. Incidences
of complete loss of family or terminal illness might
also lead to suicidality in rational, “normal” people
[Pridmore, 2011]. Thus, observing the context of sui-
cidality majorly weakens the legitimacy of the over-
arching statement that suicidality is inevitably linked
to mental illness.
The contemporary idea that suicidality is inher-
ently tied to mental illness is based in a flawed sys-
tem of medical “knowledge” that emphasizes the os-
tensible abnormality of suicide based on its moral
wrongness [Marsh, 2013]. This initial characteriza-
tion conflated abnormality with immorality and led
to suicidality being understood as a mental illness
rather than a rational state of mind with culturally
determined moral value. At the time of the initial
pathologization of suicidality during the early 1800s,
the institutionalization of the “mad” was emerging
[Scull, 1991]. The concept of “the insane”” was shift-
ing from being understood as an obscure, scattered
demographic, to being seen as a measurable, danger-
ous population [Scull, 1991]. Institutions were built
to hold the insane, but were often a guise to de-
tain criminals, the poor, and other social outcasts
[Scull, 1991]. As society grew critical of this prac-
tice and more interested in the causes of insanity,
the medical field intervened and created the concept
which we now call “mental illness” [Marsh, 2013].
The perceived moral wrongness of suicidality made it
a prime candidate for medicalization, which would al-
low medical professionals to exercise control over the
suicidal population. As Ian Marsh explains in their
work on the historiography of suicide, “the arguments
for. . . madness were somewhat sketchy. . . the force
of such statements relied less on supporting empirical
evidence, more on an emerging and productive config-
uration of power-knowledge,” [Marsh, 2013]. By po-
sitioning suicidality as an internal, individual pathol-
ogy and ignoring the social context, medical pro-
fessionals reframed a mindset which had historically
been seen as rational in some Western histories and
in other cultures.
This new knowledge system surrounding suici-
dality has undergone considerable change since its
formation but remains largely intact today. Marsh
discusses the current “regime of truth,” in which
the seemingly fundamental pathologization of suicide
dominates modern thought surrounding suicidality,
and the only substantive discussions revolve around
treatment, not nature or cause (2013). Suicide is in-
dividualized and decontextualized based on the claim
that denying the contribution of mental illness to
suicidality is dangerous and ignorant [Marsh, 2013].
This type of discourse equates the consideration of
non-pathological factors with the complete rejection
of the contribution of pathology, effectively blocking
critical analysis of the current Western understanding
of suicidality. These strategies reinforce the appar-
ent strength of this understanding without providing
actual evidence for its legitimacy.
In their work “Medicalisation of Suicide,” Saxby
Pridmore argues that there are major scientific flaws
in conceptualizing suicidality as a medical problem
[Pridmore, 2011]. Pridmore finds that psychological
autopsies – a main source of scientific evidence for
the causal nature between mental illness and suicide
– are highly subjective methods of research whose
retrospective nature renders them unreliable and of
questionable validity (2011). They also point to the
sometimes-fallacious medicalization of distress as a
factor in the problematic research; when contextu-
ally reasonable levels of distress are perceived as dis-
ordered, suicide is inevitably pathologized, because
distress is almost always a precursor to suicidality
[Pridmore, 2011]. This process of applying medical
diagnoses to “inescapable aspects of. . . being human”
allows suicidality to be viewed as abnormal even when
it is based in rational human judgement of unen-
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durable conditions [Pridmore, 2011].
Factors other than mental illness are also preva-
lent in causing suicide, according to several studies
performed in Asia which found social determinants to
be the leading cause of suicidality [Pridmore, 2011].
In modern non-Western cultures, suicide is frequently
seen as the result of people observing reality ratio-
nally and making a decision [Pridmore, 2011]. So-
ciologists have argued that suicidal actions contain
social meaning, and that suicidality is measurably
exacerbated in those embodying certain intersection-
alities [Wray et al., 2011]. Suicidality is also concep-
tualized as a rational individual’s purposefully com-
municative act, which is utilized to critique society,
rather than an unstable individual’s desperate es-
cape [Hayakawa, 1957]. Thus, not only is the cur-
rent framework of mental illness and suicidality in-
herently flawed, but there are also many other sub-
stantial causes of suicidality that do not call the san-
ity of the individual into question.
This paper has argued that the dominant con-
tention of modern Western thought that suicidality
and mental illness are inherently linked is flawed and
that suicidality cannot necessarily prove the existence
of something as fluid as mental illness. No human
state, including suicidality, can necessarily prove the
existence of something as fluid as mental illness. Cul-
tural and historical analyses demonstrate that there
are cases in which suicide is a rational act, and that
the suicide-mental-illness framework is flawed. Con-
ceptualizing suicidality only within the rigid frame-
work of mental illness inhibits meaningful analysis of
how suicidality develops and the implementation of
important methods of suicide prevention. As stated
by Pridmore, “the great disadvantage of all-suicide-
is-caused-by-mental-disorder thinking is that impor-
tant social, cultural, economic, and political factors,
about which much might be done, are neglected in
favour of the medical solution,” (2011). Thus, suici-
dality is logically unable to be conceptualized as nec-
essarily indicative of mental illness, and framing it as
such poses a threat to the development of prevention
and treatment. This calls for broad reassessment of
social and medical understandings of suicidality and
mental illness in the context of lived experiences.
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